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MIND AND ITS OBJECTS.
No. 93 Mr. J. E. Turner makes some oommente on my paper
sis of Realism to which I will reply briefly, thanking him for
IH MUCD O
on the Ba < . . . „
them. My reply will be brief for the alleged inconsistencies appear to
me to rest on verbal misunderstandings ; and otherwise Mr. Turner
raises questions which could only be answered now at great length and
fall outaide the limits of my paper. I refer to the comments by their
numbers.
(1) and (2). In speaking of the compresence of mind and its object I
add the caution that compresenoe does not imply simultaneity but only
belonging to one world. As I was speaking of mind, I said " one ex-
perienced world". Mr. Turner supposes that the point lies in the word
experienced ". It might have been omitted, perhaps with advantage,
but ne himself sees that any two compresent things experience one
another in my view, in a wide sense of experience. Thus his difficulty
that oompresenoe has not the same sense as between mind and its
objects and as between two physical objects disappears. I suppose
from (2) that he finds it impossible to speak of the oompresence of
mind with a past object (as e.g. when I see the sun eight minutes late).
That oomes from denying the reality of time, so that the past as past
ceases to be real. (See also on (4) below.) But for me time is real,
quite extraordinarily real; and the past as past is just as real as the
present, only it is not present.
(3) Mr. Turner thinks that I commit the confusion of denying con-
sciousness to be a relation and at the same time holding knowing to be
a relation. He is mistaken. Consciousness (including knowing) is an
act and stands in relation with its object. I call the relation the cog-
nitive relation, which corresponds to tho word " of" in the phrase
" consciousness of the object ' (p. 14). On page 24, which he quotes
imperfectly, I say "object and subject enter into a relation, that of
being known on one hand and that of knowing on the other ". The
relation of knowing is the oognitave relation ; knowing itself is an act.
Only we do not say knowing of, though we do say knowledge of.
On the basis of this misconception that knowing and with it perceiving,
oonceiving, etc, are relations while consciousness itself is not, I am sup-
posed (0) to hold that consciousness is different from them. Of course
those are all specifio conscious acts, whioh, equally of course, are in
relation with their objects.
(4) The proposition that "the mini knows things " is declared incon-
sistent with the proposition that "the mind is the whole tissue of mental
processes, considered as a whole". Apparently "knows " (underlined)
is taken with some different interpretation from mine, but if so I am not
chargeable'with inoonsistenoy. But I think Mr. Turner means that a
tusue of processes in time cannot have the identity necessary for know-
ledge, because a temporal series is transient. In fact time is taken to
b« unreal. I quite admit the problem involved. But Mr. Turner for-
gets that I spoke of mind as a tissue of processes. That was enough for
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my purpose. Bat I did not analyse process or a tissue of them. Suoh
an analysis would I believe remove the difficulty. But it would mean
an investigation of motion. Meantime I plead that the work can only
be done empirically. We must not start with preconceptions about time.
It may turn out that though the empirical facts may be hard to under-
stand, it is the preconceptions that may be wrong. Nobody doubts that
Ceasar really vxu assassinated.
(6) Consciousness was said by me to be a new quality which emerges
in nervous process when it is of a certain grade. The act of conscious-
ness is the process as having this quality. I referred and can only again
refer to the later chapters of Mr. Lloyd Morgan's Instinct aiuL Experience.
Mr. Turner thinks my whole doctrine of the spatiality of mind commits
us to materialism. But though mind should be expressible without
residue in terms of motion, it is not therefore mere motion. On the
contrary there is a higher quality than mere motion, namely mind.
Here too there is a far deeper problem. Can there be anything which
does not oontain something corresponding to mind ? As to materialism,
if it were materialum what is there so dreadful in that ? I think myself
it is as far as possible removed from materialism as that word is under-
stood. But if it is materialism, then you would have to oount Spinoza
amongst others a materialist. And for my part if I am sent to a part of
the Inferno where I shall be in sight of Spinoza I shall think I am being
let off very easily.
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